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Abstract
The landmark study of race and education in the United States known as the "Coleman Report" (Coleman et
al. 1966) concluded that family characteristics are more important determinants of educational achievement
than school quality or teacher experience, particularly in the early stages of schooling. From this result sprang
two prominent lines of academic inquiry. The first focuses on so-called education production functions (e.g.,
Hanushek 1997), with an eye toward cost-benefit analyses of various investments in teachers and schools.
These studies often pay little attention to family background variables, treating them as exogenous controls.
The second line of inquiry seeks to promote social policies that foster student achievement by studying why
family background has such a pronounced effect on children's acquisition of human capital.
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I. Introduction
The landmark study of race and education in the United States known as the
“Coleman Report” (Coleman et al. 1966) concluded that family characteristics
are more important determinants of educational achievement than school qual-
ity or teacher experience, particularly in the early stages of schooling. From
this result sprang two prominent lines of academic inquiry. The ﬁrst focuses
on so-called education production functions (e.g., Hanushek 1997), with an
eye toward cost-beneﬁt analyses of various investments in teachers and schools.
These studies often pay little attention to family background variables, treating
them as exogenous controls. The second line of inquiry seeks to promote social
policies that foster student achievement by studying why family background
has such a pronounced effect on children’s acquisition of human capital.
Among the latter group, Behrman et al. (1997) ﬁnd that rural Pakistani
children whose fathers completed junior secondary school score 31% higher
on reading tests and 29% higher on mathematics tests than children whose
fathers did not. Similarly, Case and Deaton (1999) show that the head of
household’s education inﬂuences literacy and numeracy scores for black South
African high school students. These relationships have generally been found
to be robust to the inclusion of various household, school, and community-
level characteristics, suggesting that parental education has a real effect on
children’s human capital acquisition (Strauss and Thomas 1995). In addition,
Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) ﬁnd a strong relationship between mother’s ed-
ucation and mathematics and reading test scores using matched household-
school data from Ghana. The fact that father’s education does not also strongly
I am grateful to the Spencer Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, and the Center for Chinese Studies
at the University of Michigan for supporting the ﬁeldwork and writing of this research. Albert
Park, David Lam, Jan Svejnar, and Bob Willis provided many helpful suggestions. This article
also beneﬁted tremendously from comments by Axel Anderson, Andrew Coleman, Eric Edmonds,
Emily Hannum, Sandy Hofferth, Chris Ryan, Steve Salant, and two anonymous referees. Remaining
errors are my own. Contact the author at phbrown@colby.edu.
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inﬂuence child learning in this study suggests that human capital investments
may depend on both parent and child gender, a ﬁnding consistent with the
conclusions of Lillard and Willis (1994) for Malaysia and Thomas (1994) for
Brazil, Ghana, and the United States.
Still, the reasons that parental education has such a pronounced effect on
child learning are not very well understood. One explanation that is often
posited is that more educated parents make greater investments in children’s
human capital (Strauss and Thomas 1995) by providing higher levels of goods
and services that complement learning and by devoting more time to their
children.1 However, more educated parents in poor households without access
to credit may face a trade-off between providing more goods and allocating
more time to interacting with their children. Speciﬁcally, more educated par-
ents may receive higher wages and thus may have a higher opportunity cost
of time spent outside the workplace. Such parents may forgo some time spent
interacting with children to spend more time working and may make greater
investments in goods for their children’s human capital production as a result.
Alternatively, parental education may increase the efﬁciency or effectiveness
of the time spent interacting with children, and more educated parents may
thus forgo some time spent working in order to make greater time investments
in their children’s human capital. However, if the returns to education are
higher for the children of more educated parents or if parental education
positively inﬂuences parental preferences for children’s education, then more
educated parents may make greater investments in both goods and time, even
in poor households. Unfortunately, in the absence of very restrictive assump-
tions about the functional form of the human capital production function and
about the degree of substitutability of goods and time in human capital
production, theory has little to say about the effect of parental education on
investments in children’s human capital.2
Whether and how more educated parents make greater investments in their
children’s human capital are thus important empirical questions. Due to data
limitations, however, relatively few empirical studies have been undertaken.
Sathar and Lloyd (1994) investigate the impact of parental education on ed-
ucational expenditures using survey data from Pakistan. They ﬁnd that house-
hold spending on children’s education is up to 75% higher if mothers ever
attended school relative to households wherein mothers did not. Similarly,
1 Hereafter, the term “goods” will refer both to goods and to services used in human capital
production.
2 Comparative static results showing ambiguous effects of parental education on investments for
simple models featuring Cobb-Douglas human capital production and quasilinear human capital
production are available from the author on request.
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Behrman et al. (1999) analyze how mother’s education affects parental time
allocation using household data from India. Controlling for workforce partic-
ipation, they ﬁnd that literate mothers spend more time than illiterate mothers
on total time allocated to “home care,” which is deﬁned as caring for children
and performing household chores. These results suggest that more educated
parents may make greater investments in both goods and time, although
neither article addresses this question speciﬁcally.
Using a survey of children and their families, teachers, and school and
village leaders in 100 rural villages in Gansu province, China, this study
examines how parental education affects educational investments in children,
focusing on investments in goods and time. The detailed data used in this
work afford several innovations. First, the data capture more complete measures
of educational investments than those used elsewhere in the literature. For
example, nonrequired education-related expenditures, whether the household
owns children’s reading materials, and whether the household has a designated
study area for the sampled child measure investments in goods used in
children’s human capital production. The number of hours that parents spend
helping their children with homework each week, whether parents read to
the sampled child, and whether parents discuss their children’s school per-
formance with teachers measure parental investments in time used in children’s
human capital production. Second, a comprehensive teacher ranking captures
numerous aspects of teacher quality that are generally unavailable elsewhere.
Moreover, teachers in Gansu generally follow a single cohort through primary
school, suggesting that the teacher ranking is likely to measure both past and
present teacher quality. Third, the relatively large number of villages allows
for village ﬁxed effects to control for school quality, local socioeconomic con-
ditions, labor market opportunities, and other forms of unobserved hetero-
geneity at the local level. Finally, a child cognitive development measure is
employed to control both for innate ability and expected returns to child
education, a key omitted variable in most studies.
It is found that more educated parents allocate higher levels of both goods
and time to their children’s human capital production, even controlling for
wealth, teacher quality, village ﬁxed effects, and child cognitive development.
Evidence suggests that more educated parents expect higher returns to edu-
cation for their children, offering one reason why parents in resource-con-
strained households make greater investments in both goods and time. It is
also found that the effect of mother’s and father’s education differs, with a
marginal year of mother’s education having a larger impact on time invest-
ments than a marginal year of father’s education.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section II provides an
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overview of China’s rural education system; Section III describes the empirical
strategy and discusses some identiﬁcation issues; Section IV introduces the
data and variables; the effect of parental education on investments in children’s
human capital is analyzed empirically in Section V; and Section VI concludes.
II. China’s Rural Educational System
Education is widely seen as a key determinant of future income and occu-
pational attainment in modern China (Davis 1992; Knight and Song 1993;
Hannum 1998). At a minimum, education helps rural residents take advantage
of new farming techniques and improves access to off-farm jobs that require
literacy or numeracy (Unger 2002). Furthermore, for people who are able to
attain high levels of education, legally sanctioned urban residency and non-
manual work become possible. That is, students are granted urban residency
permits (hukou) upon admission to an urban specialized secondary school (zhong
zhuan) or university (Wu and Treiman 2004). These specialized secondary
schools and universities are open to all students on the basis of merit, at least
in principle, providing a strong incentive for rural children to pursue education.
However, economic decentralization in the post-Mao period left responsi-
bility for funding education to the county and village governments (Hannum
1998), and in recent years, tight budgets at the local level have shifted the
burden to parents through a series of school fees (Unger 2002). Schooling is
often relatively expensive as a result, with school fees representing a sizable
portion of rural household’s incomes. Paying for schooling thus exacerbates
economic hardships in poor rural villages (Tsang 1994).
Although schooling is generally underfunded, the central government made
9 years of education compulsory in the late 1990s. Nearly all Chinese children
thus enroll in primary school (Unger 2002; Connelly and Zheng 2003).3
Because of the high cost, however, resource-constrained parents often withdraw
their children before the 9 compulsory years of education have been completed,
with academic performance and child gender strongly inﬂuencing this decision.
For example, Brown and Park (2002) show that academically weak girls typ-
ically drop out of primary school (xiao xue) while academically weak boys
generally ﬁnish primary school and enroll in junior secondary school (chu zhong).
This ﬁnding is consistent with those of Hannum and Xie (1994), who describe
sons receiving a disproportionate share of education in resource-constrained
households because virilocal marriage (in which daughters marry out of the
3 Unger (2002, 185) writes,“To a degree that is at once touching and inspiring, parents in these
poor villages generally make major sacriﬁces to keep their children in school, even when it means
cutting back on the quality or quantity of food consumed or on other very basic essentials.”
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family) is the dominant practice in China and because sons are generally
responsible for caring for parents in their old age.
While children are still in school, rural parents often make signiﬁcant
nonrequired investments in their children’s education (Hannum 2005) to
increase their chances for gaining off-farm employment and admission to
competitive secondary schools and universities. Such investments may include
the purchase of educational goods and services (e.g., dictionaries, notebooks,
reading material, desks, and tutors) and the provision of time for educational
purposes (e.g., time spent helping children with homework, time spent reading
to children, and time spent discussing a child’s academic performance with
his or her teachers) as well as other forms (Kong 2003).
Teacher and school quality vary widely across and within provinces. Despite
high enrollment fees, school budgets in rural parts of China are often inad-
equate to pay teachers on time, to purchase supplies, or to make needed
structural repairs. Classrooms may lack basic infrastructure such as a sufﬁcient
number of chairs and desks, functional blackboards, and electricity.4 Top grad-
uates from teachers’ colleges are typically assigned to key schools in urban
areas, leaving rural areas with teachers who may be less motivated or less well
trained (Sargent and Hannum 2005) when they are available at all. Many rural
communities cope with teacher shortages by hiring community members who
have had no formal training to teach classes (Wang 2002). Furthermore,
teachers in much of rural China follow student cohorts through school; students
who attend school in poorly equipped classrooms or who are assigned to low
quality teachers face high hurdles in their studies.
All but the largest rural villages have a single primary school comprising
6 years of education. Junior secondary schools consist of 3 years of schooling
and are typically located in a larger village or in the township to which several
villages belong. Due to the restrictive residency permit system, children almost
always attend the nearest school; private schools and school choice are virtually
nonexistent in most of rural China.5 Moreover, the vast majority of the children
of rural-urban labor migrants remain in their home villages for schooling—
even when their parents migrate for extended periods—because rural residents
face much higher pricing in schooling, health care, and other services in urban
4 The worst schools I visited during survey ﬁeldwork were barely functional: windows were missing
or broken; a single piece of charcoal was used to heat a large classroom for an entire day; student-
teacher ratios were very high due to inadequate funding for teacher salaries; and some teachers had
acquired just a few years more education than their students. By contrast, schools in urban centers
were generally modern, warm, and efﬁcient.
5 Similarly, Li and Zhang (2004) state that China’s residency permit system rules out endogenous
sorting in the context of fertility.
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areas (Solinger 1999; Du, Park, and Wang 2005). Finally, children may enroll
in school as early as age 6, although many rural families delay school enrollment
until age 7 or 8.
III. Empirical Speciﬁcation
Investments in children’s human capital (INVEST) are manifest in the pro-
vision of goods for educational purposes and time spent interacting with
children. Investment in goods is measured by the household’s total expenditure
on nonrequired educational goods, that is, spending on school supplies and
private tutoring. This measure excludes school fees, required textbooks, re-
quired uniforms, and other required spending for enrolled children. Investment
in goods used in human capital production is also measured by whether the
household has children’s reading materials and whether the household has a
designated study area for the sampled child. Parental time used in the pro-
duction of children’s human capital is measured by the total number of hours
parents spend helping their children with homework each week and by mea-
sures for whether parents read to the sampled child and whether either parent
meets with the sampled child’s teachers to discuss his or her schooling.
The determinants of educational investment i in household h may be es-
timated by ordinary least squares or a linear probability model as follows:
INVEST p a b FED  b MED  F b K bih 1 ih 2 ih ih 3 ih 4
 b (FED #MALE ) b (MED #MALE ) e , (1)5 ih ih 6 ih ih ih
where FED and MED are the number of grades completed by fathers and
mothers, respectively; is a vector of family characteristics including father’sF
age (FAGE), mother’s age (MAGE),6 the number of other enrolled children
(ENROLLED), and the number of nonenrolled children (NONENR) in the
household; is a vector of child-speciﬁc characteristics such as sex (MALE),K
age, and grade level; and eih is an error term. Because father’s and mother’s
education may affect investments in sons and daughters differently (see, e.g.,
Glewwe and Jacoby 1994; Lillard and Willis 1994; Thomas 1994), the sex
of the sampled child is interacted separately with mother’s and father’s
education.
Parental education has many correlates that may inﬂuence investments in
children’s human capital, and controlling for these effects may better identify
6 The timing of parental education may have implications for interpreting estimates because the
quality and content of education have likely evolved over time, and controlling for measures such
as parental age may help to mitigate this variation. A series of parental age dummies was also
used to capture these effects, although the results are largely the same.
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the true effect of parental education. For example, more educated parents may
face less severe resource constraints; failing to control for household wealth
may thus bias the estimated effect of parental education upward. Similarly,
parental education may inﬂuence the decision to invest in children’s human
capital in response to either high or low teacher quality and school quality.
A child’s cognitive development may also affect the optimal household allo-
cation because more educated parents may invest more in very gifted children
or may help less gifted children by providing greater investments in their
education. Additionally, local socioeconomic conditions, local labor market
opportunities, and community preferences may also inﬂuence investment de-
cisions. To test the robustness of the relationship between parental education
and educational investments, wealth, teacher quality (TCHRRANK) and
school and community characteristics (implemented via ﬁxed effects), and a
dummy for high cognitive development (HICOG) are added iteratively to the
model described in equation (1). Finally, a model estimating the effect of
parental education on educational investment i in household h in village v
that incorporates all of these controls is estimated as follows:
INVEST p a b FED  b MED  F b K bihv 1 ihv 2 ihv ihv 3 ihv 4
 b (FED #MALE ) b (MED #MALE )5 ihv ihv 6 ihv ihv
 bWEALTH  b TCHRRANK  b HICOG7 ihv 8 ihv 9 ihv
 b (HICOG #MALE) b (FED#HICOG ) (2)10 ihv 11 ihv
 b (MED#HICOG )12 ihv
 b (FED#HICOG #MALE)13 ihv
 b (MED#HICOG #MALE) g  e ,14 ihv iv ihv
where is a village ﬁxed effect. Note that the cognitive development measuregv
is interacted with parental education and child gender to allow for the pos-
sibility that parents invest differently in high-scoring boys and girls. If parental
education is shown to have a positive effect on education investments even
conditioning on this rich set of controls, then it will have been demonstrated
that investments in education are an important means by which parental
education inﬂuences child education.
Notably, the predicted values for dichotomous measures fall within the
[0, 1] range, and the linear probability model facilitates simple implementation
of ﬁxed effects (below). To account for the fact that the error terms are likely
correlated across the six different investments, the models are estimated jointly
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via Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression method; because the re-
gressors are identical across investments, this approach is asymptotically equiv-
alent to ordinary least squares.
While omitted variable bias may be mitigated by including the regressors
described above, measurement error in educational investments may bias the
estimated effect of investments on children’s test scores. For example, Robinson
(1985) and Hofferth (1999) ﬁnd that more educated mothers are more likely
to overstate time engaged in socially desirable activities such as reading to
children. Fortunately, measurement error in the investments included in this
study is likely to be minimal. First, nonrequired educational expenditures are
constructed from detailed consumption records rather than a single response,
a method that has been demonstrated to reduce reporting error (Biemer et al.
2004). Second, whether the household has children’s reading material and
whether the sampled child has a designated study area were readily observable
by survey enumerators; reporting error in these investments should thus be
small. Third, parents and children were asked independently about parental
reading to children. In most cases, children and parents gave the same answer.
In cases where the responses did not match, children were as likely as parents
to state that parents read to children, suggesting that any reporting error was
not systematic. Similarly, parents and teachers were asked independently
whether parents meet with teachers to discuss their children’s schooling. As
above, the responses matched in the vast majority of cases; where they did
not, parents were no more likely than teachers to report that meetings took
place, again suggesting that any reporting error is not systematic.7 Finally,
Juster (1985) ﬁnds that reporting error in time allocation is greatly reduced
when a given activity is undertaken regularly and with limited variation. If
assistance with homework is given frequently and regularly, then reporting
error is likely to be small.
IV. Data and Variables
The data come from the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF),8 a
survey of 1,970 children ages 9–12 and their families in a province located
7 One possible explanation for any difference in responses is that the teacher’s questionnaire asked
about parent/teacher discussions with parents within the previous month, whereas the mother’s
questionnaire asked about discussions within the previous year.
8 The GSCF was administered in 2000. It was a collaborative effort between researchers in China,
Canada, and the United States, including the author.
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in northwestern China.9 Gansu’s 25.3 million people are primarily engaged
in agriculture, and the province is broadly reﬂective of other western provinces
in its low income, low educational attainment, and low expenditures on ed-
ucation. The multistage sample drew 20 counties from all nonurban, non-
Tibetan counties and 100 villages from those counties.10 Within each village,
children in the correct age range were drawn with equal probability. Separate
instruments were administered to children, mothers, heads of household, and
village leaders as well as to teachers and principals of children who were enrolled
in school at the time of the survey. A cognitive development test was also
administered to each child.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The average household spends 46.5
RMB per year on nonrequired educational goods and services for the sampled
child.11 Only 6.2% of households allocate less than 10 RMB to educational
goods, while 1.8% of households spend at least 200 RMB. Some 54.4% of
households have children’s books, and 58.8% have designated study areas for
children, for example, a child’s desk, work table, or bookshelf. On average,
mothers and fathers spend 4.1 hours in total helping children with homework
each week, although parents do not help their children with homework at all
in 32.5% of the sampled households. At the other extreme, 5.7% of households
spend at least 14 hours per week helping children with homework.12 Time
spent helping children with homework is inclusive of all children, not just
the sampled child. Parents read to the sampled child in almost two-thirds of
the surveyed households and discuss the sampled child’s school performance
with teachers in 76.2% of the surveyed households.
Fathers have completed one grade in junior secondary school on average,
while mothers have completed 4.2 primary grades.13 Fathers spend all or part
9 Of the 1,970 children in the sample, 16 did not reside full time in the sampled village, 17
others were missing important household demographic data such as parental education, and 19
were not enrolled in school at the time of the survey (6 of whom had dropped out of primary
school and 1 of whom dropped out after completing primary school). The sample is thus restricted
to the 1,918 children who were enrolled in school at the time of the survey, who were full-time
residents of the village, and who have complete parent, schooling, and teacher data. For variables
common to both the restricted and unrestricted samples, the data are largely indistinguishable.
10 Of Gansu’s 86 counties, seven are predominantly Tibetan. These counties were omitted from
the sampling because Mandarin is not widely spoken in these areas.
11 In 2000, US$1 p 8.27 Chinese RMB.
12 This statistic is averaged across the entire year and thus properly accounts for parents who
migrate for part of the year.
13 Although I cannot distinguish between birth parents, adoptive parents, and stepparents, Hofferth
and Anderson (2003) ﬁnd that biology is less important than marital responsibility in fathers’
investments in children.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Description Unit Mean SD Min Max
EXPEND Nonrequired
expenditures RMB 46.519 55.595 0 836
BOOKS Has children’s books Dummy .544 .498 0 1
DESK Has designated
study area Dummy .588 .492 0 1
HELP Time helping with
homework Hours/week 4.121 4.953 0 35
READ Parents read to
child Dummy .657 .475 0 1
DISCUSS Discuss schooling
with teacher Dummy .762 .426 0 1
FED Father’s education Grades 6.985 3.515 0 15
MED Mother’s education Grades 4.190 3.514 0 12
FAGE Father’s age Years 37.411 4.846 27 57
MAGE Mother’s age Years 35.060 4.210 25 55
FRES Father’s village
residency Months/year 9.935 3.475 0 12
MRES Mother’s village
residency Months/year 11.732 1.547 0 12
MALE Male child Dummy .539 .499 0 1
AGE Child’s age Years 11.019 1.069 9 12.9
GRADE Child’s grade Current level 4.301 1.343 1 9
ENROLLED Other enrolled
children Number .866 .714 0 4
NONENR Nonenrolled
children Number .452 .638 0 4
WEALTH Household wealth RMB 14,773.81 16,963.81 115 209,740
TCHRRANK Teacher quality
ranking 0 p probation,
1 p rank 1,
2 p rank 2,
3 p highest 1.468 .953 0 3
HICOG Above average cog-
nitive score Dummy .490 .500 0 1
of 2 months working outside the village on average, although the median
father does not migrate at all. Fewer than 4% of women migrate for work,
and both parents are absent for the entire year in only six households. The
present value of housing and other durables (a measure indicative of household
wealth) averages 14,773.8 RMB, but there is considerable variation. For ex-
ample, 3% of households possess over 50,000 RMB in durables.
Boys constitute 53.9% of the sample. Primary school enrollees account for
96.0% of the sample, an artifact not only of the ages of the sampled children
but also of the delayed age of enrollment prevalent in Gansu. The median
child is in fourth grade, having enrolled at age 7. The household has 0.9 other
enrolled children and 0.4 nonenrolled children, on average.
Teachers are regularly and systematically evaluated on such disparate mea-
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TABLE 2
PARENTAL EDUCATION AND EDUCATION-RELATED INVESTMENTS
Investment Unit
Parental Education Quartiles
1 2 3 4
EXPEND RMB 33.97 47.37 52.10 54.01
BOOKS Dummy .38 .52 .64 .64
DESK Dummy .47 .54 .64 .73
HELP Hours/week 2.24 3.91 4.90 5.72
READ Dummy .50 .63 .71 .82
DISCUSS Dummy .65 .75 .79 .88
sures as education, experience, attendance, professional publications, student
test performance, and student and peer evaluations (Park and Hannum 2001).
Because this ofﬁcial quality ranking incorporates many aspects of teacher qual-
ity, it is likely to be more informative than measures of teacher quality used
in other countries. Moreover, teachers in the surveyed areas follow student
cohorts through school, so controlling for current teacher quality goes a long
way toward controlling for the quality of teachers in former grades.
The child cognitive development test was developed by researchers at the
Institute for Psychology at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and was
designed to be independent of academic achievement. This measure is em-
ployed to control both for innate ability and expected returns to child edu-
cation. Scores on the cognitive development test do vary signiﬁcantly by age,
however, so test scores were converted into Z-scores by age measured in half-
year increments.
Finally, it should be noted that China’s system of restrictive residency laws
prevents rural residents from legally attending school outside their registered
residence areas. Since most villages have only one school, village ﬁxed effects
control for school quality as well as local socioeconomic conditions, labor
market opportunities, and other forms of unobserved heterogeneity.
V. Investment in Goods and Services
Table 2 presents cross-tabulations of parental education and educational in-
vestments. Neglecting other factors, investments in both goods and time rise
monotonically with parental education, suggesting that more educated parents
make greater investments in both goods and time.
A. Estimates
The effect of father’s and mother’s education on the provision of six different
education-related investments is estimated via seemingly unrelated regression
methods. Note that because the regressors are the same across all six spec-
iﬁcations, seemingly unrelated regression is asymptotically equivalent to
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TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS
EXPEND BOOKS DESK HELP READ DISCUSS
Estimates:
FED .0228*** .0152*** .0103** .1986*** .0093** .0056
(2.59) (3.09) (2.10) (4.08) (2.00) (1.31)
MED .0332*** .0173*** .0143*** .2706*** .0261*** .0173***
(3.62) (3.39) (2.81) (5.33) (5.37) (3.88)
FAGE .0088 .0023 .0003 .0296 .0090** .0044
(1.33) (.63) (.09) (.81) (2.58) (1.35)
MAGE .0035 .0129*** .0021 .0474 .0085** .0028
(.45) (3.03) (.50) (1.12) (2.10) (.75)
MALE .0452 .0200 .0420 .0867 .0033 .0308
(.50) (.040) (.48) (.17) (.07) (.70)
AGE .0148 .0442c .0454*** .2144 .0184 .0206*
(.60) (3.25) (3.34) (1.59) (1.42) (1.73)
ENROLLED .4460*** .0657*** .0062 .162 .0358** .0044
(14.10) (3.74) (.35) (.93) (2.14) (.28)
NONENR .009 .0764*** .027 .0460 .0302 .0180
(.25) (3.78) (1.34) (.23) (1.57) (1.02)
FED#MALE .0044 .0013 .0036 .0554 .0029 .0076
(.36) (.20) (.54) (.83) (.46) (1.30)
MED#MALE .0147 .0052 .0046 .0421 .0025 .0002
(1.21) (.77) (.68) (.63) (.39) (.03)
Constant 1.3456*** .3397 1.1130*** 8.1775*** .6245*** .6983***
(3.62) (1.64) (5.38) (3.98) (3.17) (3.86)
Hypotheses:
1. H0: FEDp 0
for boys 10.28*** 8.61** 2.00 9.34*** 7.47*** 10.34***
2. H0: MEDp
for boys0 4.94* 6.85** 16.66*** 46.08*** 42.00*** 18.62***
3. H0: FEDp
for girlsMED .50 .07 .25 .79 4.69** 2.71
4. H0: FEDp
forMED
boys .39 .05 2.56 4.96** 5.02** .40
Note. Grade dummies are included; for estimates, t-statistics are in parentheses; for hypotheses, F-
statistics are shown.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
ordinary least squares regression. Estimates from the parsimonious model
(eq. [1]), which controls for parental age, child gender and age, and other
children in the household, is presented in table 3.
Parental education has a strongly signiﬁcant effect on the provision of ed-
ucation-related goods for daughters. An additional year of father’s education
(FED) increases predicted spending on nonrequired educational goods (EX-
PEND) for daughters by 2.3% (signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level). Similarly, an
additional year of father’s education raises the probability that the household
has children’s reading materials (BOOKS) by 1.5 percentage points (2.8% of
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the mean, signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level) and the probability that a daughter
has a designated study area (DESK) by 1.0 percentage points (1.8% of the
mean, signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level). The effect of mother’s education (MED)
on the provision of education-related goods for daughters is somewhat larger:
an additional year of completed education raises predicted education-related
spending by 3.3%, increases the probability that the household has children’s
books by 1.7 percentage points, and increases the probability that the daughter
has a designated study area by 1.4 percentage points (all signiﬁcant at the
0.01 level). Although all of the point estimates are larger for mothers than
for fathers, F-tests show that the hypothesis that there are effects of father’s
and mother’s education on goods investments for daughters cannot be rejected.
Interactions of parental education and a male child dummy (MALE) are not
statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting the absence of systematic gender bias in
goods investments on the part of both mothers and fathers. Speciﬁcally, an
additional year of father’s education increases predicted expenditures by 2.7%
(signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level) for sons and increases the probability that chil-
dren’s books are available in the household by 1.4 percentage points (signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level). However, an additional year of father’s education does not
have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the likelihood that the son has a
designated study area. The effect of mother’s education on education-related
expenditures and on the provision of books is smaller for sons than for daugh-
ters, although the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. An additional year
of mother’s education raises the probability of books being provided by 1.2
percentage points (signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level). By contrast, the effect of an
additional year of mother’s education on the probability that a child has a
designated study area is larger for sons (1.9 percentage points, signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level) than for daughters, although the difference is again not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. As with daughters, I cannot reject the hypothesis that
father’s and mother’s education have statistically identical effects on goods
investments in sons’ education.
Older students are less likely to have access to certain educational goods:
an additional year of age reduces the probability that a household has children’s
books by 4.4% and reduces the probability that a child has a designated study
area by 4.5% (both signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level). This suggests that poorer
parents may delay their children’s enrollment or that parents with less favorable
views of education may delay enrollment and may provide fewer investments.
Alternatively, older students may perform better in school, and hence the
return to such investments may be low. The presence of other children in the
household (ENROLLED and NONENR)—whether or not they are enrolled
in school—similarly reduces the likelihood that a household has children’s
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reading material by 6.6%–7.6% (signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level), suggesting that
additional children crowd out investment in educational goods. Interestingly,
there is no statistically signiﬁcant effect of additional children on the proba-
bility that a child has a designated study area. An additional child enrolled
in school increases spending on nonrequired educational goods by 44.6%
(signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level), while nonenrolled children have no such effect,
suggesting either that some of the nonrequired expenditures are strongly en-
couraged or that children’s reading materials are not seen as being as valuable
an investment as other education-related goods.
Similar results are found for parental investments in time, yet some im-
portant differences are evident. An additional year of father’s education increases
the time allocated to helping children with homework each week (HELP) by
0.20 hours when the sampled child is a daughter, 4.8% of the mean (signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level). An additional year of mother’s education raises the amount
of time allocated to helping children with homework by 0.27 hours when the
sampled child is a daughter (signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level). However, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the marginal effect of education on time allocated
to helping children with homework is statistically identical for mothers and
fathers. More educated parents are more likely to read to their daughters
(READ), with an additional year of father’s education increasing the probability
by 0.9 percentage points, 1.4% of the mean (signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level) and
an additional year of mother’s education increasing the probability by 2.6
percentage points (signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level). Moreover, results of an F-test
show that the effect of parental education on the level of investment differs
between mothers and fathers (signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level), suggesting that
mother’s education leads to more time investments in children’s education.
An additional year of father’s education does not signiﬁcantly affect the prob-
ability that parents discuss a daughter’s schooling with her teachers (DISCUSS),
but an additional year of mother’s education raises this probability by 1.7
percentage points, 2.3% of the mean (signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level). The dif-
ference in the estimated effect of parental education is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.10 level, suggesting again that mother’s education leads to dispro-
portionate time investments in children’s education.
As with goods investments, the interaction of parental education and the
male dummy does not yield statistically signiﬁcant estimates, suggesting that
gender bias in time investments is very minor. An additional year of father’s
education raises the weekly time that parents allocate to helping children with
homework by 0.14 hours when the sampled child is male, raises the probability
that parents read to a son by 1.2 percentage points, and raises the probability
that parents discuss a son’s schooling with his teachers by 1.3% (all signiﬁcant
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at the 0.01 level). An additional year of mother’s education raises the weekly
time that parents allocate to helping children with homework by 0.31 hours
when the sampled child is male, raises the probability that parents read to a
son by 2.9 percentage points, and raises the probability that parents discuss
a son’s schooling with his teachers by 1.8 percentage points (all signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level). The effect of mother’s education on the time allocated to
helping children with homework and the probability the parents read to sons
is larger than that of father’s education (both signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level),
again suggesting that mother’s education has a larger effect on time investments
in education than father’s education.
Child age has a negative effect on the probability that parents discuss their
children’s schooling with teachers, with an additional year reducing the prob-
ability by 2.1 percentage points (signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level). As discussed
above, it may be the case that poor parents can afford neither to enroll their
children on time nor to leave work to talk with children’s teachers. Alter-
natively, this may reﬂect lower interest on the part of parents or older children
doing sufﬁciently better in school that this investment is not warranted. The
number of other children reduces the probability that parents read to the
sampled child (signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level for other children enrolled in school),
again suggesting that other children may vie for parent’s time. Curiously, the
number of children does not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the time
that parents allocate to helping with homework; the number of older siblings
is negatively correlated with the time that parents devote to helping with
homework, suggesting that older siblings substitute for parents in helping
younger children.
It is thus evident that more parental education is associated with larger
educational investments in both goods and time. Moreover, while higher
mother’s and father’s education lead to similar increases in goods investments,
additional education on the part of the mother leads to disproportionately
higher time investments. Finally, there is no statistical evidence suggesting
that either parent favors children of one gender over the other when it comes
to making education-related investments.
B. Robustness
While the parsimonious model highlights the relationship between parental
education and investments in children’s learning across a variety of investments,
it does not account for other important determinants of educational invest-
ments. As discussed in Section III, more educated parents may have fewer
resource constraints; thus controlling for household wealth may isolate the
true relationship between parental education and investments in children’s
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schooling. Similarly, more educated parents invest differently in their children’s
education to compensate for teacher and school quality; if more educated
parents are better able to assess teacher competence or school quality, then
controlling for these attributes may better identify the relationship between
parental education and educational investments. Finally, a child’s cognitive
development may affect the optimal investment because more educated parents
may invest more in very gifted children. Alternatively, more educated parents
may help less gifted children by providing greater investments in their school-
ing. These three possibilities are explored in tables 4–7.
The logged value of household durables (WEALTH) has a strong and positive
effect on educational expenditures (table 4). The elasticity of wealth with
respect to nonrequired educational expenditures is 0.11 (signiﬁcant at the 0.01
level). Similarly, a 1% increase in the value of durables increases the probability
that the household has children’s reading materials by 0.11 percentage points
and increases the probability that the household has a designated study area
for the child by 0.09 percentage points (both signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level).
The value of household durables does not signiﬁcantly affect investments in
time.
Controlling for the value of household durables has little effect on the point
estimates for parental education. For example, including the wealth measure
reduces the estimated effect of an additional year of father’s education on
expenditures for daughters from 2.3% to 1.9%, remaining signiﬁcant at the
0.05 level. Indeed, for every investment except time allocated to helping
children with homework (owing to a weakly negative relationship between
wealth and time spent helping with homework), the point estimates fall
slightly when controlling for wealth. With the exception of the effect of father’s
education on the probability that the household has a designated study area
for daughters, these effects also remain statistically signiﬁcant. An additional
year of mother’s education raises the probability that a household has a des-
ignated study area for a sampled son by 1.6 percentage points, whereas an
additional year of father’s education raises this probability by only 0.3 per-
centage points, a difference that is signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level. Otherwise,
the differential effects of mother’s and father’s education remain as above.
Note again that there is no statistical evidence in favor of gender bias in any
investment.
With the inclusion of village ﬁxed effects to account for differences in school
quality (as well as unobserved heterogeneity at the local level), the teacher
quality variable (TCHRRANK) does not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect
on the provision on educational investments (table 5). This suggests that poor
teacher quality is not the primary concern of parents who make educational
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TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS WITH CONTROLS FOR WEALTH
EXPEND BOOKS DESK HELP READ DISCUSS
Estimates:
FED .0193** .0115** .0073 .2033*** .0090* .0053
(2.19) (2.39) (1.51) (4.16) (1.92) (1.22)
MED .0291*** .0131*** .0109** .2760*** .0257*** .0169***
(3.18) (2.61) (2.16) (5.42) (5.27) (3.77)
FAGE .0125* .0015 .0028 .0345 .0087** .0047
(1.88) (.41) (.75) (.93) (2.47) (1.46)
MAGE .0066 .0097** .0005 .0433 .0083** .0031
(.86) (2.32) (.11) (1.02) (2.03) (.83)
MALE .045 .0197 .0419 .0870 .0033 .0308
(.50) (.40) (.85) (.18) (.07) (.70)
AGE .0220 .0366*** .0393*** .2241* .0178 .0198*
(.91) (2.74) (2.92) (1.66) (1.37) (1.67)
ENROLLED .4515*** .0601*** .0016 .1692 .0353** .0049
(14.35) (3.48) (.09) (.97) (2.11) (.32)
NONENR .0152 .0700*** .0218 .0543 .0297 .0186
(.42) (3.53) (1.09) (.27) (1.54) (1.05)
FED#MALE .0038 .0019 .0041 .0547 .0029 .0076
(.32) (.29) (.62) (.82) (.45) (1.29)
MED#MALE .0136 .004 .0055 .0407 .0026 .0003
(1.13) (.61) (.83) (.61) (.40) (.05)
WEALTH .1055*** .1092*** .0889*** .1408 .0094 .0111
(4.71) (8.90) (7.19) (1.13) (.79) (1.01)
Constant .3778 .6621*** .2977 9.4688*** .5384** .5968***
(.89) (2.85) (1.27) (4.03) (2.39) (2.89)
Hypotheses:
1. H0: FEDp 0
for boys 7.43*** 4.28** .48 9.96*** 6.96*** 9.58***
2. H0: MEDp
for boys0 3.52* 3.98** 12.85** 46.98*** 40.99*** 17.87***
3. H0: FEDp
for girlsMED .46 .04 .20 .81 4.67** 2.69
4. H0: FEDp
forMED
boys .30 .00 3.05* 4.87** 5.08** .42
Note. Grade dummies are included; for estimates, t-statistics are in parentheses; for hypotheses, F-
statistics are shown.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
investments.14 The addition of these controls reduces the point estimates for
father’s education on all six educational investments for both sons and daugh-
ters. For example, an additional year of father’s education raises nonrequired
expenditure for a son by 2.0% when controlling for teacher quality and village
14 An alternative explanation that teacher quality varies little within individual schools in Gansu
has been ruled out by Park and Hannum (2001). Teacher rank does have a modest effect on
investments in the absence of village ﬁxed effects, but the other estimates are not appreciably
different from those in the parsimonious model described above.
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TABLE 5
DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENTS WITH CONTROLS FOR TEACHER QUALITY
AND VILLAGE FIXED EFFECTS
EXPEND BOOKS DESK HELP READ DISCUSS
Estimate:
FED .0197** .0078* .0094** .1817*** .0067 .0006
(2.46) (1.69) (2.06) (3.79) (1.48) (.15)
MED .0097 .0091 .0075 .2258*** .0189*** .0108**
(1.12) (1.84) (1.52) (4.39) (3.88) (2.41)
FAGE .0086 .0018 .0003 .0699* .0098*** .0027
(1.41) (.52) (.08) (1.92) (2.85) (.85)
MAGE .0036 .0062 .0009 .0313 .0046 .0003
(.51) (1.54) (.22) (.74) (1.14) (.09)
MALE .0672 .0349 .0435 .0654 .0023 .0577
(.84) (.76) (.95) (.14) (.05) (1.37)
AGE .0035 .0214 .0377*** .0056 .0057 .0143
(.15) (1.59) (2.82) (.04) (.43) (1.17)
ENROLLED .4772*** .0124 .0215 .0401 .0191 .0057
(15.47) (.70) (1.22) (.22) (1.09) (.35)
NONENR .0250 .0117 .0192 .0910 .0052 .0001
(.74) (.60) (.99) (.45) (.27) (.01)
FED#MALE .0001 .0029 .0029 .0277 .0035 .0106*
(.01) (.47) (.46) (.43) (.58) (1.88)
MED#MALE .0063 .0102 .0014 .0106 .003 .0006
(.57) (1.62) (.22) (.16) (.48) (.10)
TCHRRANK .0025 .0124 .0099 .0124 .0110 .0036
(.11) (.93) (.75) (.09) (.83) (.30)
Constant 1.6364*** .7070*** 1.2296*** 5.6610** .7545*** .8029***
(4.13) (3.11) (5.45) (2.39) (3.36) (3.88)
Hypotheses:
1. H0: FEDp 0
for boys 6.56** 5.76** 2.22 11.07*** 5.48** 6.17**
2. H0: MEDp
for boys0 .18 .06 3.89** 20.83*** 24.07** 6.23**
3. H0: FEDp
for girlsMED .57 .03 .07 .30 2.59 2.69
4. H0: FEDp
forMED
boys 1.69 2.61 .10 .65 2.63 .00
Note. Grade dummies are included; for estimates, t-statistics are in parentheses; for hypotheses, F-
statistics are shown;
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
characteristics versus 2.7% in the parsimonious speciﬁcation. Nevertheless, the
effect remains positive and signiﬁcant (generally at the 0.05 level or above)
for the same investments for both sons and daughters, with the exception of
reading to daughters.
The effects of mother’s education on the probability that the household
owns children’s reading materials and on the probability that sons have des-
ignated study areas remain positive and statistically different from zero (albeit
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with reduced point estimates). By contrast, the effect of mother’s education
on goods investments virtually disappears when controlling for teacher quality
and school and village characteristics. For example, an additional year of
mother’s education increases expenditures for boys by 1.9% in the parsimonious
speciﬁcation but increases expenditures for boys by only 0.3% with the ad-
ditional controls. When excluding father’s education from this ﬁxed effects
regression, however, the effect of mother’s education on goods investment is
strong, positive, and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the reductions in statistical
signiﬁcance are due to multicollinearity between mother’s and father’s edu-
cation. However, the effect of mother’s education on investments in time
remains positive and highly signiﬁcant (at the 0.05 level or above) even in
the original speciﬁcation in which father’s education is included as a regressor.
The hypothesis that the effects of mother’s and father’s education on edu-
cational investments are equal cannot be rejected in this speciﬁcation. Nev-
ertheless, the hypotheses stating that mother’s and father’s education have
equal effects on the probabilities that sons have access to reading material,
that parents read to sons, that parents read to daughters, and that parents
discuss schooling with daughters’ teachers are nearly signiﬁcant with p-values
ranging between 0.101 and 0.108. Thus, the pattern described above in which
mother’s education results in disproportionate investments in time for children
of both sexes persists. Moreover, it appears that father’s education results in
somewhat greater goods investments for sons, but not daughters.
Finally, there is some weak evidence for preferential treatment of sons by
fathers in this speciﬁcation. An additional year of father’s education does not
have any discernible effect on the probability that parents discuss a daughter’s
education with her teachers, but it does increase the probability that parents
discuss a son’s schooling with his teachers by 1.0%, a difference that is sig-
niﬁcant at the 0.10 level. This provides weak statistical evidence for systematic
gender bias in educational investments.
High cognitive development among children (HICOG) has a weakly positive
direct effect on educational investments undertaken by parents (table 6). Chil-
dren with above-average cognitive development are 19.8 percentage points
more likely to have access to children’s reading material (signiﬁcant at the
0.01 level) and are 17.5 percentage points more likely to have parents who
read to them (signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level), suggesting that parents reward
children with higher cognitive development. Cognitive development does not
have a statistically signiﬁcant direct effect on other investments.15
More educated parents make greater educational investments even when
15 None of the foregoing results is sensitive to different cut-offs for high cognitive development.
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controlling for child cognitive development. For example, an additional year
of father’s education raises the probability that parents provide reading ma-
terials to children who do not score above average on the cognitive development
test by between 1.5 percentage points (signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level) and 2.0
percentage points (signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level). The effect of father’s education
is not signiﬁcant for either sons or daughters with high cognitive development.
An additional year of mother’s education increases the probability that parents
provide reading materials to daughters who do not score highly by 1.6 per-
centage points and to sons who do not score highly by 2.2 percentage points
(both signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level). Furthermore, mother’s education increases
the probability that high-scoring daughters have access to reading materials
in the home by 1.8 percentage points (signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level). The effect
of mother’s education on providing reading material to high-scoring sons is
negligible.
Results for time investments are similar. An additional year of father’s
education raises the probability that parents read to the sampled child by 1.8
percentage points for daughters who do not score highly on the cognitive
development test (signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level); the effect of father’s education
for low-scoring sons and for high-scoring sons and daughters is not signiﬁcantly
different from 0. An additional year of mother’s education raises the probability
that parents read to the sampled child by 2.4 percentage points for daughters
who do not score highly, by 3.6 percentage points for sons who do not score
highly, and by 2.8 percentage points for high-scoring daughters (all signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level). Mother’s education has no effect for high-scoring sons.
Indeed, mother’s education is associated with signiﬁcantly higher investments
for all gender-ability combinations with the exception of high-scoring boys;
father’s education has a signiﬁcant effect on four of the six investments for
low-scoring boys and girls and on two of the six investments for high-scoring
girls.
With the inclusion of the cognitive development measure, the statistical
differences in the effects of father’s and mother’s education are more pro-
nounced. For example, an additional year of father’s education raises predicted
expenditures on educational goods by 2.1% for sons who have not scored above
average on the cognitive development test, while an additional year of mother’s
education raises predicted spending by 0.6%, a difference that is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level. However, the effect of mother’s education on
investments for sons who have not scored highly on the cognitive test is
signiﬁcantly larger than that of father’s education for each of the other ﬁve
investments. For example, an additional year of father’s education raises the
time allocated to helping a son with homework by 0.14 hours while an
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additional year of mother’s education raises the time allocated by 0.37 hours,
a difference that is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Interestingly, there is no
discernible difference in the effect of father’s and mother’s education for daugh-
ters who have not scored highly on the cognitive test or for sons who have.
For high-scoring daughters, however, mother’s education has a larger effect
than father’s education for both the probability that a parent reads to the
sampled daughter and the probability that parents discuss schooling with her
teachers. Overall, these results suggest that the effect of mother’s education
on investment in both goods and time is larger than that of father’s education
and that this difference is especially pronounced for time investments.
It is also interesting to note that the interaction term of mother’s education
and the male child dummy is negative in education-related expenditures (sig-
niﬁcant at the 0.10 level), suggesting that more educated mothers favor low-
scoring daughters over low-scoring sons. By contrast, there is evidence to
suggest that more educated fathers favor high-scoring sons over high-scoring
daughters in terms of reading to children (signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level). These
ﬁndings again suggest that some mild gender bias may exist in educational
investments.
Table 7 presents results from regressions in which wealth, teacher quality,
child cognitive development, and village ﬁxed effects are all added to the
parsimonious speciﬁcation. Interestingly, any statistical signiﬁcance of the high
cognitive development measure disappears when ﬁxed effects are included,
suggesting that the cognitive development score correlates with some unob-
served characteristic of the village.16 Nevertheless, the inclusion of village ﬁxed
effects reduces the estimated effect of mother’s education on investment in
goods, likely as a result of multicollinearity with father’s education.17 Still,
mother’s education has a small negative effect (signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level)
on the probability that a son who has not scored highly on the cognitive
development test has a study area. The negative coefﬁcient suggests that
mother’s education correlates with some unobserved characteristic of the village
that affects certain expenditures.18 Parental education remains a positive and
signiﬁcant determinant of most of the time investments for children who
scored below average on the cognitive development test. However, father’s
16 For example, some communities may have norms about children’s diets, which have been shown
to affect cognitive development in numerous developing countries (e.g., Freeman et al. 1980).
17 The point estimates for mother’s education are largely positive and signiﬁcant when father’s
education is omitted from the regression.
18 If more educated mothers are more likely to live in villages in which schools are open late to
promote studying, then more educated mothers may substitute studying at school for studying at
home.
782
TA
B
LE
7
D
E
TE
R
M
IN
A
N
TS
O
F
E
D
U
C
A
TI
O
N
A
L
IN
V
E
ST
M
E
N
TS
W
IT
H
A
FU
LL
SE
T
O
F
C
O
N
TR
O
LS
E
X
P
E
N
D
B
O
O
K
S
D
E
SK
H
E
LP
R
E
A
D
D
IS
C
U
SS
E
st
im
at
es
:
FE
D
.0
19
6 *
.0
05
8
.0
10
4*
.1
33
1*
*
.0
15
1*
*
.0
05
1
(1
.8
6)
(.9
6)
(1
.7
4)
(2
.1
1)
(2
.5
3)
(.9
2)
M
E
D
.0
14
1
.0
07
8
.0
00
8
.2
25
6*
**
.0
16
6*
*
.0
08
5
(1
.1
8)
(1
.1
5)
(.1
1)
(3
.1
6)
(2
.4
6)
(1
.3
6)
FA
G
E
.0
10
4 *

.0
00
0
.0
01
4

.0
68
5*

.0
09
9*
**
.0
02
7
(1
.7
0)
(.0
1)
(.4
0)
(1
.8
7)
(2
.8
5)
(.8
4)
M
A
G
E
.0
02
5
.0
04
8

.0
00
3

.0
33
6
.0
04
7
.0
00
3
(.3
5)
(1
.1
9)
(.0
8)
(.7
9)
(1
.1
7)
(.0
7)
M
A
LE
.1
28
0
.0
31
2
.0
31
6

.2
46
8
.0
66
9

.0
43
1
(1
.2
1)
(.2
2)
(.5
3)
(.3
9)
(1
.1
2)
(.7
8)
A
G
E

.0
03
4

.0
17
8

.0
37
5 *
**
.0
45
0

.0
03
8

.0
14
6
(.1
4)
(1
.3
1)
(2
.7
8)
(.3
2)
(.2
8)
(1
.1
7)
E
N
R
O
LL
E
D
.4
71
4*
**
.0
06
2
.0
16
0

.0
51
3
.0
17
1
.0
05
0
(1
5.
22
)
(.3
5)
(.9
1)
(.2
8)
(.9
7)
(.3
1)
N
O
N
E
N
R
.0
21
2

.0
15
7

.0
22
4

.0
99
6
.0
02
4

.0
00
8
(.6
2)
(.8
1)
(1
.1
6)
(.4
9)
(.1
3)
(.0
4)
FE
D
#
M
A
LE

.0
04
4

.0
01
1

.0
06
3

.0
15
3

.0
11
8
.0
04
5
(.3
0)
(.1
3)
(.7
6)
(.1
7)
(1
.4
3)
(.5
9)
M
E
D
#
M
A
LE

.0
19
9
.0
01
6

.0
12
1
.0
53
9
.0
13
0
.0
06
5
(1
.2
8)
(.1
8)
(1
.3
7)
(.5
8)
(1
.4
7)
(.8
0)
W
E
A
LT
H
.0
59
4 *
**
.0
67
5*
**
.0
61
2*
**
.0
60
2
.0
02
2
.0
04
6
(2
.6
1)
(5
.2
0)
(4
.7
4)
(.4
4)
(.1
7)
(.3
8)
TC
H
R
R
A
N
K

.0
04
7
.0
12
4
.0
08
8

.0
03
5
.0
13
3
.0
04
3
(.2
0)
(.9
4)
(.6
7)
(.0
3)
(1
.0
1)
(.3
6)
H
IC
O
G

.0
53
6
.0
36
5
.0
14
7

.2
90
6
.1
32
8
.0
68
5
(.4
2)
(.5
1)
(.2
0)
(.3
8)
(1
.8
5)
(1
.0
4)
H
IC
O
G
#
FE
D

.0
03
4

.0
00
2

.0
06
9
.1
60
7

.0
19
7 *
*

.0
13
6
(.2
1)
(.0
2)
(.7
6)
(1
.1
2)
(2
.1
8)
(1
.6
3)
783
H
IC
O
G
#
M
E
D

.0
12
9

.0
01
2
.0
09
9

.0
09
5
.0
05
6
.0
05
8
(.7
8)
(.1
2)
(1
.0
5)
(.1
0)
(.5
9)
(.6
7)
H
IC
O
G
#
M
A
LE

.1
38
3
.0
41
3
.0
16
6
.7
08
6

.1
65
0 *
.0
36
9
(.8
4)
(.4
4)
(.1
8)
(.7
2)
(1
.7
7)
(.4
3)
H
IC
O
G
#
FE
D
#
M
A
LE

.0
08
2
.0
06
9
.0
07
2

.0
39
5
.0
34
3*
*
.0
14
0
(.3
7)
(.5
5)
(.5
8)
(.3
0)
(2
.7
7)
(1
.2
3)
H
IC
O
G
#
M
E
D
#
M
A
LE
.0
27
1

.0
21
3 *

.0
19
8

.1
16
3

.0
20
6

.0
14
7
(1
.2
2)
(1
.6
9)
(1
.5
8)
(.8
8)
(1
.6
4)
(1
.2
8)
C
o
ns
ta
nt
1.
05
85
**
.0
15
3
.6
30
3*
*
4.
79
49
*
.6
38
8*
*
.7
24
8*
**
(2
.3
0)
(.0
6)
(2
.4
1)
(1
.7
4)
(2
.4
5)
(3
.0
1)
H
yp
o
th
es
es
:
1.
H
0:
fo
r
b
o
ys
FE
D
p
0
2.
03
.6
0
.4
6
3.
38
*
.2
9
2.
93
*
2.
H
0:
fo
r
b
o
ys
M
E
D
p
0
.2
6
2.
10
3.
97
**
16
.8
5*
**
21
.1
2*
**
6.
32
**
3.
H
0:
fo
r
g
ir
ls
FE
D
p
M
E
D
.1
0
.0
4
.9
0
.7
4
.0
2
.1
3
4.
H
0:
fo
r
b
o
ys
FE
D
p
M
E
D
1.
02
1.
85
2.
87
*
13
.5
9*
**
12
.5
7*
**
6.
49
**
*
5.
H
0:
fo
r
H
IC
O
G
FE
D
p
0
g
ir
ls
1.
80
.6
5
.2
6
10
.8
9 *
**
.4
4
1.
80
6.
H
0:
fo
r
H
IC
O
G
M
E
D
p
0
g
ir
ls
.0
1
.9
3
2.
39
8.
83
**
*
10
.4
2*
**
5.
05
**
7.
H
0:
fo
r
H
IC
O
G
FE
D
p
0
b
o
ys
.5
4
.3
3
.0
5
.8
6
2.
62
.1
0
8.
H
0:
fo
r
H
IC
O
G
M
E
D
p
0
b
o
ys
.6
3
.0
9
.0
4
.7
7
2.
63
.1
3
9.
H
0:
fo
r
H
I-
FE
D
p
M
E
D
C
O
G
g
ir
ls
.5
8
.0
1
.4
0
.0
4
5.
64
**
4.
79
**
10
.
H
0:
fo
r
H
I-
FE
D
p
M
E
D
C
O
G
b
o
ys
.4
3
5.
83
**
.0
2
.0
9
.1
1
.1
9
N
o
te
.
G
ra
d
e
d
um
m
ie
s
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
;
fo
r
es
ti
m
at
es
,t
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
;f
o
r
hy
p
o
th
es
es
,F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
ar
e
sh
o
w
n.
*
Si
g
ni
ﬁc
an
t
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l.
**
Si
g
ni
ﬁc
an
t
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l.
**
*
Si
g
ni
ﬁc
an
t
at
th
e
1%
le
ve
l.
784 economic development and cultural change
TABLE 8
PERCENTAGE OF MOTHERS WHO AGREE THAT EDUCATION HAS “A GREAT DEAL OF
INFLUENCE” ON A CHILD’S FUTURE INCOME
Junior Secondary
School versus Pri-
mary School
Senior Secondary
School versus Junior
Secondary School
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Lowest quintile of MED 41.4 40.6 51.1 46.1
Highest quintile of MED 48.7 47.1 58.2 51.8
education does not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on the probability
that parents read to high-scoring daughters or that parents discuss a high-
scoring daughter’s schooling with her teachers, and parental education does
not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on time investments in high-scoring
sons.
With all of the regressors included, father’s education is found to dispro-
portionately affect the probability that high-scoring sons have access to reading
materials in the home. By contrast, the estimated effect of mother’s education
is larger than that of father’s education for time investments in sons who did
not score highly on the cognitive development test and for daughters who
did. Mother’s education also disproportionately affects the probability that sons
who did not score highly have designated study areas. Again, these ﬁndings
suggest that the effect of mother’s education is at least as important as father’s
education in determining educational investment, especially with regards to
investments in time. Finally, there is again some limited evidence of gender
bias; more educated fathers favor high-scoring sons over high-scoring daughters
when reading to children, more educated mothers favor high-scoring daughters
when reading to children, and more educated mothers favor high-scoring
daughters over high-scoring sons when providing readingmaterials to children.
C. Discussion
As described in the introduction, the ﬁnding that both types of educational
investment rise with parental education suggests that more educated parents
perceive that the returns to education are higher for their children, that more
educated parents have different preferences for children’s education, or both.
Distinguishing between these scenarios is difﬁcult empirically, although there
is some evidence in favor of both being true.
First, mothers were asked about the expected income difference if their
children obtained a junior secondary education versus a primary education,
and if they obtained a senior secondary education versus a junior secondary
education (table 8). Among mothers in the lowest quintile of education, 41.4%
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believe that junior secondary education has “a great deal” of inﬂuence for the
future salary of boys, and 40.6% of mothers believe that junior secondary
education has “a great deal” of inﬂuence for the future salary of girls. Among
mothers in the highest quintile of education, 48.7% believe that junior sec-
ondary education has “a great deal” of inﬂuence for the future salary of boys,
and 47.1% of mothers believe that junior secondary education has “a great
deal” of inﬂuence on the future salary of girls. Some 51.1% of low education
mothers thought that senior secondary schooling makes a large difference for
boys, while 58.2% of high education mothers did. The corresponding ﬁgures
for girls at the senior secondary level are 46.1% and 51.8%. Thus, more
educated mothers perceive that the returns to education are higher for their
children. This is certainly plausible in the Chinese context, moreover, because
more educated parents generally have better access to nonfarm jobs, that is,
jobs that have higher educational requirements and offer higher incomes than
farming (e.g., Dong and Bowles 2002; Zhang, Huang, and Rozelle 2002;
Zhang and Li 2003).
Second, mothers were asked how many years of schooling they wished their
children could achieve in the absence of any constraints on ﬁnances, ability,
or time. Some 61.5% of women in the lowest two quintiles of mother’s
education responded that they wished their children could attend university.
By contrast, 75.9% of women in the highest two quintiles of mother’s edu-
cation responded that they wished their children could attend university. This
ﬁnding suggests that more educated households may have preferences for higher
levels of schooling among children. Both higher returns to education and
different preferences thus likely help to explain why more educated parents
invest more in their children’s human capital.
VI. Conclusion
The literature has documented a strong association between parental education
and child human capital development, a relationship that persists despite the
inclusion of controls for household and community background factors. This
relationship is often attributed to higher levels of investment in children’s
human capital made by more educated parents, but the nature of such in-
vestments has not been well understood. Investments in human capital may
include spending on educational goods and services and time spent interacting
with children for educational purposes, yet parents in resource-constrained
households in areas with incomplete credit markets are likely to face a trade-
off between these investments. Because more educated parents are likely to
earn higher wages, the opportunity cost of time spent outside the workplace
is high, and these parents may spend less time interacting with children in
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order to provide more goods for children’s human capital development. How-
ever, more educated parents are likely to be more adept at teaching children
in the home; thus they may forgo some time in the workplace in order to
provide more time interacting with children. Finally, more educated parents
may provide higher levels of both investments despite being resource-con-
strained if the returns to children’s human capital development differ for their
children or if such parents have different preferences for children’s education.
In this study, the determinants of six different educational investments are
estimated using a survey of children, households, schools, and communities
in northwestern China. It is shown that more educated parents are not sub-
stituting goods investments for time investments or vice versa but are, instead,
providing higher levels of both types of investments. This result is generally
robust to conditioning on a rich set of controls, including household wealth,
teacher quality, child cognitive development, and community ﬁxed effects,
suggesting that the relationship between parental education and educational
investments is quite strong. Evidence suggests that the perceived returns to
education are higher for the children of more educated mothers. In addition,
more educated mothers are shown to prefer more education for their children.
Greater investment in both goods and time among more educated parents is
thus likely explained by both higher expected returns and different preferences
for education.
A second key ﬁnding is that the marginal effect of education differs for
mothers and fathers: an additional year of mother’s education leads to greater
time investments than an additional year of father’s education. This ﬁnding
is particularly true for sons who scored below average on a cognitive devel-
opment test and for daughters who scored above average. Mother’s education
also has a stronger impact on investments in some goods investments for low-
scoring sons. An additional year of father’s education raises nonrequired ex-
penditures on sons’ education and the probability that the sampled child has
access to reading materials by more than mother’s education, although this
result is very sensitive to the empirical speciﬁcation. The pronounced difference
of parental education does not have a strong, systematic gender bias in in-
vestments; promoting education in time investments suggests that mothers
either have a greater interest in their children’s schooling or that they have a
lower opportunity cost of time.
Finally, evidence of parental bias in allocating educational investments is
limited. Speciﬁcally, fathers weakly favor sons and mothers weakly favor daugh-
ters in some educational investments. Nevertheless, these results are sensitive
to the speciﬁcation.
Therefore, if the relationship between parental education and investments
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in children’s human capital persists for future generations, then promoting
educational attainment among the current generation of students will increase
educational investments for their children, leading to higher levels of schooling
and greater investments in their children—a virtuous cycle. Furthermore,
because an additional year of mother’s education generally increases investment
in children’s human capital by more than an additional year of father’s edu-
cation, and because mother’s education does not have a strong, systematic
gender bias in investments, promoting education in the current generation of
girls is likely to have enduring effects for future generations of both girls and
boys in rural China.
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